Hyder Husain Arastu

Tag: kant

  • Parts, Wholes, and A Thing Greater Than Any That Can Be Conceived

    Parts, Wholes, and A Thing Greater Than Any That Can Be Conceived

    There has crept into my mind a certain skepticism that now takes up the greater part of my thought. I am not unsure that this is a worry I am merely restating and which has been brought up on numerous occasions in many discussions, but given its effect on me, I will share it nevertheless.

    There are parts which make wholes. But it appears to me now that this may not be the case. I will waste little time in explaining my worry, for I think it straightforward.

    If it is the case that it is the parts that make wholes, then statements of the form ‘1+4=5’ must be of the nature that nothing can be learned from them, but it is the case that knowing that ‘1+4=5’ is more than knowing ‘1’ or ‘4’ alone, so it must be the case that something new is added when a ‘truth’ of this kind is learned, it must of course be learned.

    The ‘union’ of particulars then is greater than the particulars themselves, and though it is the particulars that comprise the object, their synthesis results in something greater than their mere union, its is not the case that the summation of ‘1’ and ‘4’ results in simply x = {1,4}, but it is instead something else than contained in x, which seems to go against all intuition.

    So far, I have said little that is of surprise. It is here that I am conflicted, a natural question arises of the limits of this notion of wholes being greater than their parts, and I must inquire as to how far it applies.

    In an attempt to explore what this comprises, I thought it ‘wise’ to approach it negatively, to explore where the notion is not contained. A natural place to start would be one where a statement is made that contains its own self, an analytic judgement. Of course this is entirely unhelpful (even if we were to ignore the problems with the category of judgments on a whole) since analytic judgments do not contain parts and wholes, since they are by their own definition contained in themselves, applying this line of thinking could not yield anything of benefit.

    Since I can conceive of no manner of judgement (thought) wherein it is meaningful to say then that the whole is equal to its parts, I am forced to conclude at this time that this universally applies.

    What occurs now to me is the Cartesian assertion of the third meditation, where it is claimed that an effect must have at least as much formal reality as does the cause, but this cannot hold, since if parts make wholes, and it is the case that the wholes are the effects of their parts, then it is necessarily always the case that every effect is greater than its cause.

    And yet, ironically enough, though I have directed this towards the third meditation, it in effect provides a similar assertion, insofar as it is the conclusion of the extension of this line of thinking is concerned. If it is the case that everything may be conceived of as a part of something, for it cannot be the case that any object we know of can be but a part of something greater, then it must be the case that there is a whole containing every object that is a part of its, and the unity of every part is a synthesis which must be greater than everything conceivable, for it cannot be conceived, we are returned in this inversion to our original assertion.

    HEHE

  • Concerning God

    Prior to your reading this, I ask that you forgive the mild incoherence involved, for I write this at 5am- only minimally conscious.

    The Cartesian attempt falls short for it requires knowledge of God, in order to assert that God exists- Descartes’ begins with a claim of knowledge of perfection and of the attributes of perfection. The truth in the 3rd meditation though warrants greater credit, for this comes from the acknowledgement of the recognition of our finitude- of which as Descartes claims we could not conceive since knowledge of ‘finitude’ relies wholly on that of ‘infinite’, and yet this seems insufficiently satisfactory.

    Spinoza’s flaw is much greater, and his work- blasphemous. To attach attributes to ‘God’ is to recognize his like, and to recognize his like is to regard him two, and to regard him two is to mistake him, to mistake him is to have pointed at him, to have pointed is to have admitted limitation for him.

    God’s being is truth, but it cannot be through coming into being. His existence cannot be from non-existence.

    It is Kant’s discovery that truly brings to light the impossibility of making such assertions concerning God, for to make any assertion requires knowledge of that which we are incapable of. To speak of God’s action is to limit God, in time if nothing else, for to act is to have willed and to willed is to admit of a time prior to having willed and to admit of a time prior to having willed is to limit God.

    It can only be true that God’s ‘creation’ was not action as we have conceived action. He realized them fully and created them without innovation, he commenced it without creation, without any aspiration of mind.

    Yet to assert even this requires some conception of God, for how can one claim the impossibility of knowledge without knowledge? To assert ignorance requires in itself an acknowledgement of an awareness of the concept of which ignorance is being claimed, this same line of thought- Heidegger describes, “Every inquiry is a seeking. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought. Inquiry is a cognizant seeking for an entity both with regard to the fact that it is and with regard to its Being as it is. This cognizant seeking can take the form of ‘ investigating’, in which one lays bare that which the question is about and ascertains its character. Any inquiry, as an inquiry about something, has that which is asked about”, to ask of something requires prior cognition of the thing that is asked, and to assert anything requires the same.

    It thus becomes so that to say that ‘God cannot be conceived‘ is itself contradictory for the statement relies on a prior conception of God, it must then be true that God can be conceived. And if God can be conceived, God’s existence is self-evident, not through proving the attributes of God, but simply through knowing.

    I aim here to argue this, that the non-existence of God is what requires proving, to claim that God does not exist requires a demonstration that the statement is itself not self-contradictory. The fault of a long line of philosophers is their attempt to prove the most self-evident of all truths.

    The truth of God is greater than the truth of ‘being’, the latter of which is rarely attempted to be proved. To ask one to prove that there ‘is’, is ridiculous, and yet the same concerning the former is constantly attempted.