It is turning out to be that what I speak most of concerns ethics, I am perhaps then deceiving myself in believing that this is not my primary interest… Does that make me inauthentic, and consequently my actions immoral?
A question that plagues my waking hours at this time is that of authenticity. Within the Aristotelian framework for virtue, to be virtuous is to have your reason disposed towards the kalon (fine), and for your passions to be in harmony with this disposition.
Further, within this framework, it is the case that to ‘become’ virtuous requires a sort of ‘fake it till you make it’ attitude. That to become virtuous one begins by emulating virtue, analogous to pursuing a craft- in this regard virtue is a craft (tekne).
But what if reason tells you that to deceive yourself is vice? I cannot but be confident of an awareness of that which is the moral action to take, and this appears to be an orientation towards the kalon; and yet reason asks of me that I do otherwise.
I am left in a predicament- that either I do that which is kalon, pretending that I do it for the sake of the kalon, and yet with full knowledge that I would prefer to do otherwise; OR, that I act viciously, but do something beneficial.
Deception cannot be virtuous for it admits of an inadequacy of my own self, and yet to ‘without’ being deceptive to act in a manner that ‘feels’ appropriate is to indulge in what I am confident is vicious.
How does one reach a reconciliation in a scenario such? It is the reason of the psuche that itself appears to be at odds with itself.
To act virtuously is in such a regard seemingly impossible. Is it virtuous to be yourself or is it virtuous to pretend to be something you are not?
Perhaps it is the case that what I feel is correct is to give in to my ‘appetites’, on the contrary, since I cannot decide for certain what is correct and only through reference to that external to me which I take to be instances of virtue that I seem to define what is to be classified as virtue.
And yet how am I capable of possessing a disposition to the kalon if it happens to be that I can do this only through a priori knowledge of its?
This reasoning appears circular, it implies that to be virtuous, I must first know virtue. But had I known virtue, why would I need to ‘become’ virtuous? And if virtue is foreign to me, how do I acquire it?
Hyder Husain Arastu 